Chevrolet has announced that it will leave the car market in western Europe and that it will continue its sales in eastern Europe and Russia. This news was not quite surprising for observers. However, the huge surprise is the success of fellow Koreans, Hyundai and Kia.
The Chevrolets sold in America were all made in Korea in the factories that used to be owned by Daewoo, except for the handful of Camaros and Corvettes, which were authentically American.
The news poses an interesting case study: General Motors is a motor manufacturing giant that has over 80 years experience making and selling cars in Europe, and it takes over a Korean company that had previously outsold Hyundai, yet ended up being trounced here by a company which has barely a fraction of GM’s European heritage.
There was nothing wrong in principle with the idea of GM having a value brand to compete with the likes of Skoda. However, there was little evidence of either value or brand with Chevrolet—the main issue was the product. Hyundai (and Kia possibly even more so) had a determination to understand and conquer Europe that bordered on the terrifying—from the Accent to the i30 in one jump was an amazing achievement. Chevrolet had all the hallmarks of fat, lumbering pre-bankruptcy General Motors.
The cars were moderate, the value was moderate, and everything was moderate, as if the accountants had pared everything back to the minimum acceptable level. But why pay £10,000, or even £15,000, on a car from an unfamiliar manufacturer that had no distinguishing features? It might just have worked if the brand was strong enough. In fact, the name stood for almost nothing in the minds of the British. Everyone knows what a Kia is for good value, surprisingly good design and high quality. But Chevrolet never established any identity with the public.
In the end, Chevrolet’s incessant losses in Europe were a problem that General Motors could do without. With Opel/Vauxhall still heavily loss-making, GM decided that it made more sense to spend all its energy on the big European problem that might be solvable, rather than the small one that almost certainly wasn’t.
